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Abstract 
 I analyze the impact of Kansas House Bills HB 2117 and HB 2059, which made changes 
to the personal income tax structure and sales tax rates in the state of Kansas in 2012 and 
beyond. Using county-level, quarterly data gathered from the Census Bureau and the Bureau of 
Economic Analysis, I examine a full sample of Kansas and its four bordering states; Colorado, 
Missouri, Nebraska, and Oklahoma in order to determine the impact the tax changes had on the 
private sector employment in the state of Kansas. I subsequently use Kansas county-level, 
quarterly data to create a sample of Kansas border counties and their border pair matches, which 
consist of their adjacent counties in the neighboring states, to employ a differencing model to 
examine those same effects. With this analysis I isolate the policy change taking place in Kansas 
in 2012 and assess its impact controlling for the impact of the state corporate income tax, 
individual income tax, and sales tax rates on private sector employment in Kansas counties. My 
findings indicate that Kansas has not experienced an increase in private sector employment due 
to this policy change, but rather has perhaps seen private sector employment levels fall in the 
year following the enactment of the policy change. 
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1.) Introduction 
 There is a large amount of diversity in the way that individual states of the U.S. collect 
taxes. Typically, states collect taxes from three major categories – income tax, sales tax, and 
property tax. The means in which a state government chooses to apply these taxes is generally 
referred to as the state’s tax structure. From an efficiency perspective, the goal is to design a tax 
structure which will take in a sufficient amount of revenue from taxation to fund desired 
government programs and activities, while having as little distortionary impact as possible. For 
example, it is important for states to structure their tax policy so that individuals are not 
influenced to decrease their economic activity or move their economic activity to a different 
state. Generally, an efficient tax structure is one with a low tax rate on a broad tax base. 
Reductions in taxes that increase work effort and economic growth are considered efficiency 
improving. 
 Equity in taxation is measured using the “tax burden”, the burden of taxation on 
individuals relative to their economic standing. The tax burden is computed as the ratio of taxes 
paid to gross income, also known as the average tax rate. Tax structures that are considered 
progressive are imposed in a fashion in which the average tax rate rises with ability to pay. 
Regressive taxes are just the opposite, as they tend to shift the tax burden to those with a 
relatively low ability to pay. Thus, the way in which states structure their taxes has a significant 
impact on not only the amount of revenue brought in by the state, but also the quality of life of 
the people residing in a state, both through tax burden and amenities provided. (Fisher, 2007). 
 Some states rely heavily on sales/excise tax for revenue (such as Washington), while 
other states forgo the sales tax entirely, and compensate by gathering higher levels of revenue 
through the income tax (like its neighbor Oregon) (Fisher, 2007). The tax structures that are 
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ultimately decided upon are a reflection of the states’ unique economic or physical 
characteristics. For instance, states that rely heavily on tourism may use a tax structure such that 
sales tax rates are comparatively high, especially on things related to tourism such as hotels and 
rental cars. Similarly, states that have an abundance of a natural resource have the opportunity to 
tax those resources in order to bring in greater percentages of revenue from non-residents. This 
method of taxation is common and is referred to as “exporting the tax burden”. Tax exportation 
occurs when a tax imposed in a certain jurisdiction is paid by a taxpayer that belongs to a 
different jurisdiction. Exportation of taxes is beneficial to states, as decreasing the tax burden on 
its residents improves their economic standing, and thus quality of life. Fisher (2007) notes that 
the steps which each state takes towards exporting as much of its tax burden as possible account 
for a significant portion of the differences in state tax structures. 
 As of the 2010 fiscal year, U.S. state and local governments on average retained a fairly 
consistent and diversified tax structure since the early 1980’s. In the 2010 fiscal year, state and 
local governments on average collected 35% of their total tax revenues from property taxes, 34% 
from sales tax, 20% from individual income tax, 3% from corporate income tax, and 8% from 
other sources.1 There are seven states that did not collect any revenue from personal income tax 
– Alaska, Florida, Nevada, South Dakota, Texas, Washington, and Wyoming. Another two states 
– Tennessee and New Hampshire, collected only 1% and 1.6%, respectively, of their total 
revenue from personal income taxes. Oregon relied most heavily on personal income taxes, as it 
accounted for 37.7% of their total revenue. Within Kansas and its bordering states, Missouri 
gathered 24.3% of its total tax revenue from personal income, Kansas 23.6%, Nebraska 20.6%, 
                                                          
1 Note that across states, unincorporated business income is taxed as personal income. Most businesses are 
unincorporated, including CPA, lawyers, doctor partnerships, restaurants, and many others. These businesses take 
the form of L.L.C., Sole Proprietorships, S Corps, and partnerships and their profits are passed through to the owner 
to be taxed as personal income. 
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Colorado 20% and Oklahoma 19.5%. All states took in at least some revenue from sales tax, 
with Oregon relying on sales tax the least, at 10% (Malm & Kant, 2013). 
 In addition to efficiency and equity issues, another way to characterize a tax system is by 
the extent to which the revenue portfolio is diversified. A diversified tax system generates a less 
volatile source of revenue. Of the three big tax sources, income tax revenues tend to be the most 
volatile, followed by sales tax revenues, and lastly property tax revenues. Felix (2008) measures 
states’ diversification of their tax revenue portfolio. Like many other states, Kansas put an 
approximately equal weight on property, sales, and income tax, which boded well for a stable 
revenue flow. In fact, Felix (2008) reports that “Kansas had the least volatile tax revenues in the 
Tenth District over the past 40 years” (p. 78).2 Growth rates and stability of taxes are important 
to understanding and measuring overall performance of tax revenues (Felix 2008). 
 From 1993 to 2012, Kansas had the same three bracket structure for their income taxes. 
For a couple living in Kansas, the first $30,000 would be taxed at a rate of 3.5%. For income 
earned between $30,000 and $60,000, the tax rate would be 6.25%. Any income earned above 
$60,000 was taxed at 6.45% (Tax Foundation, 2013). During this time period Kansas had what 
was considered to be a progressive tax structure. The tax brackets Kansas used from 1993 to 
2012 were not indexed for inflation. This is important to note, as it means that as nominal 
income during this time period rose, even if real income stayed the same, Kansas would see an 
increase in revenues (Felix, 2008). 
                                                          
2 The Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City covers the 10th District of the Federal Reserve, which 
includes Colorado, Kansas, Nebraska, Oklahoma, Wyoming, and portions of western Missouri and northern New 
Mexico. 
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 Kansas has recently altered its tax structure by making one of the larger income tax 
changes in history. Governor Sam Brownback signed House Bill 2117 on May 22, 2012, which 
enacted the largest tax cuts Kansas has ever seen. Proponents of the legislation argue that 
reducing the taxes that unincorporated businesses and farms would pay relative to other states 
will make Kansas a desirable place to create new businesses (and thus new jobs). The bill is 
designed to carry this out in a number of ways. First, non-wage “pass-through” incomes of 
unincorporated business owners taxed as personal income are now exempt (Pass-through 
incomes are not taxed at the corporate level, but are instead passed through to the owners to be 
taxed as personal income).3 This exemption will phase in: the first $100,000 of income will be 
exempted in calendar year 2013-2014, the first $250,000 of income in 2015-2016, and starting in 
2017, all pass-through income will be exempted. Secondly, the new tax policy changes Kansas 
from a three-bracket to a two-bracket income tax policy, while reducing tax rates considerably 
across all income levels. A couple living in Kansas post-policy change pays a 2.7% rate on any 
income under $30,000 (the pre-2013 rate was 3.5%). a 4.8% rate is applied on any income above 
$30,000, compared to the pre-2013 rate of 6.45%. This significantly “flatter” structure will shift 
the tax burden away from higher earning individuals. While a flatter structure improves 
efficiency, narrowing the tax base by excluding certain forms of income from taxation does not. 
Lastly, the 2012 policy change also raised the standard deduction, which is good for low income 
earners, but post-2013, low income families cannot claim both the Earned Income Tax Credit 
and the food sales tax rebate credit, but instead may only choose one (Kansas Legislative 
Research Dept., 2012). This section of the policy change makes for a more regressive tax 
                                                          
3 Pass-through income is not taxed at the corporate level, but is instead passed through to the owners to be taxed as 
personal income. 
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structure, as lower income individuals bear a heavier portion of the tax burden than before the 
tax law changes. 
 The Kansas tax change narrows the tax base, which in turn creates deadweight loss 
through tax avoidance activities. For example, someone working as a consultant can become an 
L.L.C. (Limited Liability Company), and now take advantage of the pass through income 
exemptions. The opposition to this legislation argues that this change therefore may not create 
new economic activity, but instead shift current activity. However, the lower rates can also create 
an incentive for increased hours and job creation, potentially offsetting the negative effects of the 
narrower tax base. 
 HB2059, signed into law in June 2013, can be viewed as an extension of HB2117 in that 
it further reduces the personal income taxes in Kansas. HB2059 freezes the state sales tax at 
6.15% (presumably looking to offset some of the revenue losses projected from the income tax 
cuts). The sales tax rate, which had been 6.3% since July 2010, was scheduled to drop to 5.7% 
starting July 2013. The most significant portion of this bill makes further cuts to personal income 
taxes, putting the rates on a gradual decline from 2013 until 2018 (Shown in Table 1), when they 
would settle at rates of 2.3% for the bottom income bracket and 3.9% for the top bracket. The 
bill schedules further income tax cuts provisionally after 2018, conditional upon the rate at which 
personal income tax revenue grows. Specifically, any income tax revenue growth exceeding 2% 
triggers an automatic reduction in the marginal tax rates. Since Kansas income tax revenues tend 
to shrink in recessions and grow above 2% in expansions, this provision amounts to a phasing 
out of the Kansas personal income tax. HB2059 also reinstates some of the food sales tax rebate 
eliminated by HB2117 (KLRD, 2013).  
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 This new tax policy is expected to have a large effect on the amount of revenue the state 
of Kansas brings in over the next 5 plus years. Projections by Mark Robyn (2012) estimated that 
the cuts would decrease Kansas’ revenue by $4.54 billion total from 2013-2018 compared to the 
prior income tax structure. These predictions are now being realized in the data. For example, the 
Kansas City Star reported in May 2014 that Kansas’ revenue fell short of its official projections 
for July 2013 through May 2014 by $310 million, roughly 6 percent (Abouhalkah, 2014). 
Proponents of the new tax structure maintain that the revenue losses are only short run, 
maintaining that in the longer run, the tax cuts will grow the economy by bringing in new 
businesses and encouraging existing businesses to expand, thereby creating new jobs. Kansas 
Governor Sam Brownback stated in May of 2012, “Today’s legislation will create tens of 
thousands of new jobs and help make Kansas the best place in America to start and grow a small 
business. Now is the time to grow our economy, not state government, and that’s what this tax 
cut will do.” (Kansas Dept. of Commerce, 2012). In contrast, Johnson & Mazerov (2012) argue 
that the bill will not achieve growth effects, as the bill is targeting the wrong type of jobs. They 
contend that the type of businesses this bill will attract are in large part companies that hire very 
little or no other employees. By comparing Kansas to its neighboring states, as well as the rest of 
the U.S., we can discern whether or not these tax structure changes have in fact began to create 
enough jobs to counteract the loss of revenue from the tax cuts. 
 In this thesis, I focus on the potential efficiency improving aspects of the tax policy 
changes in terms of promoting private sector employment growth. Specifically, using county-
level, quarterly data for Kansas and its neighboring states, I test whether the policy change has 
increased private sector employment in Kansas. The remainder of my thesis is organized as 
follows. Section 2 provides background on the tax structure of these states. In section 3, I review 
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the relevant literature and research, and discuss aspects of methodology from other research 
papers that I utilize. Section 4 outlines the data used to perform the econometric analysis, and 
summarizes the models. The empirical results are then presented and analyzed in section 5. 
Section 6 contains the conclusion of my thesis. 
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2.) Tax Structure 
 Colorado, from 2003-2013, has had the lowest tax rates among the five states 
focused on in this paper. This remains true for all three of the types of tax rates we are observing, 
individual income tax rate, corporate income tax rate, and sales tax rate. Colorado had no 
changes to their tax structure over the time period of 2003-2013 concerning either sales, 
individual income, or corporate tax rates. The state sales tax remained a steady 2.9% for every 
year 2003-2013. This was the lowest state sales tax in the nation in 2013 (among states that have 
a sales tax), but it is worth noting that local sales taxes within the state will also influence 
consumer behavior. All references to tax rates from each of these 5 states from 2003-2013 are 
represented visually in Table 2. Colorado has a unique structure concerning their individual and 
corporate income tax rates. Both individual and corporate income are taxed at 4.63% of the 
federal taxable income. Federal taxable income refers to the amount of total income that is 
taxable at the federal level. This includes any income earned from wages, salaries, tips, interest 
received, dividends, business income, capital gains/losses, gambling winnings, as well as many 
other less common sources. These rates are once again both the lowest among Kansas and its 
four bordering states for each of their respective categories.  
The Tax Foundation “State Business Tax Climate Index” comes out annually and 
represents the effectiveness of the tax structure of all fifty states (and Washington D.C.). This 
study uses the differences within state tax structures to rank each state in terms of how attractive 
they are to businesses. According to the 2015 rankings released in October 2014, Colorado 
ranked 17th overall in 2012, 19th in 2013, and 20th in 2014 (Drenkard, 2014). According to Ivan 
Moreno of The Associated Press, Colorado is now within the top ten states in terms of reliance 
on income tax (2014). This report was released by the credit agency Standard and Poor’s. The 
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article goes on to say that recently, income inequality has played a key role in the amount of 
revenue that Colorado brings in from taxation. The S&P report also spoke of the volatility of 
relying on capital gains for income tax revenue. “As income inequality has risen over time, the 
overall mix of personal income has shifted in favor of capital gains and away from labor 
sources,” the report said. “Those at the top obtain more of their income from capital gains, which 
on the whole, fluctuate much more than income from wages.” (Moreno, 2014). Felix (2008) also 
identifies Colorado as a state that “places less reliance on general sales taxes and more on 
personal income taxes than the national averages”. 
 Looking forward at the future of tax structure in Colorado, the state recently rejected a 
proposal to increase income taxes that would have netted Colorado approximately $1 billion. 
However, residents overwhelmingly supported an increase in taxes on the recreational sale of 
marijuana, which is estimated to bring in $70 million per year (Moreno & Wyatt, 2013). 
Colorado is currently one of two states to allow the sale of recreational marijuana. 
For sales tax rates, Kansas increased from 4.9% to 5.3% in 2004, then again from 5.3% to 
6.3% in 2011. The sales tax rate was scheduled to be reduced to 5.7% starting in July of 2013, 
but was held at 6.15% as part of House Bill HB2059, supposedly with the intention of offsetting 
some of the revenue loss created by the income tax cuts (KLRD, 2013). Kansas was the only 
among it and its bordering states to have a sales tax change between 2004 and 2013. 
Income tax rates are where the largest changes for Kansas occurred. Concerning 
corporate income tax, Kansas was the only among the 5 states to have any change in its rates 
from 2003-2013. In 2009, corporate income tax rates decreased from 7.35% to 7.05%, and in 
2011 from 7.05% to an even 7%. Personal income tax rates in Kansas had remained the same 
from 2003 until 2012, when the changes from House Bill HB 2117 and HB 2059 went into 
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effect. These changes were discussed at length in the introduction section of this paper. 
According to the State Business Tax Climate Index (2014), Kansas ranks as the 24th most 
attractive tax structure for businesses in 2012, 25th in 2013, up to 19th in 2014, and the most 
recent rankings have Kansas slotted at 22nd for 2015. The report makes note that for Kansas’s 
2015 score, “Despite income tax cuts that are phasing in, Kansas dropped three rankings overall, 
from 19th to 22nd, as North Carolina jumped several spaces, and West Virginia’s score continued 
to improve as property tax and corporate tax improvements phased in.” 
Missouri had no changes in their tax rates for any of the individual income, corporate 
income, or sales tax rates from 2003 to 2013. Their sales tax rate was 4.225%, individual income 
tax was 6%, and the corporate income tax rate was 6.25%. Missouri is scheduled to have income 
tax cuts start phasing in during 2017 (Missouri Senate, 2014). These tax cuts will decrease 
Missouri’s personal income tax rate by 0.1% per year for five years from its current level of 6% 
to an eventual 5.5%. In order for a decrease to take effect at each year, the bill notes that “A 
reduction in the rate of tax shall only occur if the amount of net general revenue collected in the 
previous fiscal year exceeds the highest amount of net general revenue collected in any of the 
three fiscal years prior to such fiscal year by at least one hundred fifty million dollars.” (S.B. 509 
& 496). The bill also will create an income tax deduction, which it will phase in at 5% each year 
beginning in 2017, giving Missouri’s taxpayers at its end the opportunity to deduct 25% from 
their business income taxes (Missouri Senate, 2014). Missouri in the Business Climate Index 
ranked 15th in 2012, 16th in 2013, and 16th again in 2014. The Index makes note of the tax change 
enacted by S.B. 509 & 496, and states that these changes will be reflected in the 2018 rankings 
(Tax Foundation, 2014). 
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 Overall, Missouri draws 30.2% of its total tax revenue from property taxes, which is the 
34th highest rate among states. It also relies on sales tax for 37.7% of its total revenue, the 16th 
highest mark. 24.3% of Missouri’s revenue comes from personal income tax, which is also the 
16th highest margin in the state. Corporate income taxes make up just 1.4% of its total, the 9th 
lowest mark in the U.S (Tax Foundation, 2013).  
Nebraska saw increases in both the sales tax rate (from 5% to 5.5%) and individual 
income tax rate (from 6.68% to 6.84%) in 2004, but had no changes in these three rates from 
then through 2013. Sales tax rate has held at 5.5%, corporate income tax rate at 7.81%, and 
individual income tax rate at 6.84%. Nebraska has made a move upwards in the Tax 
Foundation’s Index since though, going from 35th in 2012 to 34th in 2013 and 2014 to now being 
ranked 29th in the most recent year, due to recent improvements in the structure of corporate and 
individual tax rates, “including reform of corporate net operating loss carryforwards, a repeal of 
the individual alternative minimum tax, and indexation of the brackets of the individual income 
tax code” (Drenkard, 2014). During the 2010 fiscal year, Nebraska gathered 31.9% of their 
revenue from general sales taxes, and 20.6% from personal income taxes. Nebraska is close to 
the median in both categories among U.S. states (Malm & Kant, 2013).  
Oklahoma had multiple changes to their individual income tax rates between 2003 and 
2013. In 2003 the individual income rate was 6.65%, and increased to 7% in 2004. From there, 
the rate starts decreasing almost yearly before settling at 5.25% in 2012 and 2013. The corporate 
income tax rate in Oklahoma was exactly 6% for every year 2003-2013. The sales tax rate in 
Oklahoma also did not change and was 4.5% throughout this time period. Oklahoma ranked 30th 
in 2012 of the Business Climate Index, 35th in 2013, and 33rd in 2014. Oklahoma governor Mary 
12 
 
Fallin signed into effect income tax cuts for Oklahomans starting with a reduction to 5% in 2015 
and to 4.85% in 2016, so long as the state meets a certain level of revenue (Olafson, 2013). 
 In the 2010 fiscal year, Oklahoma drew 41.9% of their revenue from sales tax, good for 
the fourteenth highest rate among states in the U.S. Only 19.5% of their revenue came from 
personal income tax, though, which was the nineteenth lowest rate in the U.S. at the time (Malm 
& Kant, 2013). Oklahoma is unique among Kansas and its bordering states in the sense that it 
draws a large portion of its revenue from severance taxes (Oklahoma Policy Institutes, 2008). 
Severance tax is a specialized type of income tax that applies to owners who sell natural 
resources gathered within a jurisdiction. Whenever natural resources such as oil and coal are 
gathered in Oklahoma, the agents selling these goods must pay this severance tax to the state. 
Severance taxes can be beneficial to Oklahoma, since most of the goods are sold out of state, this 
is a way of exporting the tax burden, thus helping Oklahoma residents. However, severance tax 
can experience volatility, and therefore revenue taken in from this method may fluctuate greatly 
from year to year. In the early 1980’s, severance taxes were Oklahoma’s greatest source of tax 
revenue. Since then, it dropped off significantly in the 1990’s and has rebounded recently to now 
become a large portion of Oklahoma’s income once again (Oklahoma Policy Institute, 2008). 
Felix (2008) confirms these findings, and lists Oklahoma’s severance tax revenues as its most 
volatile source of income. 
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3.) Literature Review 
 The effects of tax changes on employment have long been a heavily researched area in 
economics. The following papers examine this effect, attempting to isolate different types of tax 
policy changes in effort to view how these changes affect the corresponding employment 
outcomes. The papers in review use a method of comparing county level data across state 
borders in order to mitigate the unobserved heterogeneity and create an appropriate control group 
for testing policy effects. 
Mikesell & Ross (2014) 
In this paper, Mikesell and Ross estimate the effect of a manufacturing machinery and 
equipment tax on the level of manufacturing employment. The manufacturing machinery and 
equipment tax (MME tax) operates similarly to a sales tax, but applies only to machinery and 
equipment used for manufacturing products. The MME tax varies from state to state, and 
between the years of 2000 and 2012, 16 different states levied the tax to some degree. Having a 
sample of states that do and do not participate in the tax provides an opportunity to view the 
effects of the tax against a control group. 
 Mikesell and Ross use a national sample of county level data from 2000 to 2012. The 
variables included in the model, along with their sources, are as follows. Manufacturing 
employment, which is the total employment listed as NAICS Industry Code 31-33, comes from 
the Bureau of Labor Statistics’ Quarterly Census of Employment and Wages. The wages per 
manufacturing worker is the average compensation of workers within this group, and comes 
from the same source. The MME tax is the rate of taxation on Manufacturing Machinery and 
Equipment, and the data for this variable were obtained by authors’ research. Each state’s 
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income tax rate and corporate income tax rate are used as well, with these data coming from the 
Tax Foundation. Sales apportionment weight is the share of corporate net income in the state 
given their nation-wide sales, which was obtained from Bernthal et al., 2012. Lastly, the 
population is simply county population from the U.S. Census. 
 The paper speculates that the MME tax has a significant impact on the level of 
manufacturing employment within a state. The identification strategy used is to observe the 
variation in MME across states and within states over time in order to isolate and identify the 
impacts of the MME on manufacturing employment. One problem the paper addresses is the fact 
that in certain areas which have higher level of manufacturing employment, political opposition 
to the MME tax is likely to be more profound, as manufacturing plants will want to minimize 
their costs, and are willing to pay up to the net present value of the costs that they would incur 
from the tax to prevent the tax change, whether it be through political pressure applied to their 
area representative or some other means. This occurrence presents a problem of a heterogeneous 
policy effect. Areas that have higher levels of manufacturing employment will raise higher 
opposition to the MME tax, this means that manufacturing employment, which is a function of 
the MME, could also itself be feeding back into the MME due to political resistance, thus 
creating the heterogeneity problem. Mikesell and Ross attempt to deal with this issue by creating 
a variable ϑit to represent this unobservable effect. Since this effect is unobservable in nature, it 
simply becomes part of the error term, causing the estimated coefficient of the MME tax to 
contain negative bias. The use of cross-pair county level data analysis rather than state level is an 
attempt to mitigate this bias by eliminating as much geographical differences between 
observations as possible. 
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 After performing analysis on fixed effects regressions, the paper found that there was a 
negative effect of capital tax on wages and employment, following intuition. However, when 
differencing a cross-border pair analysis, the results were less negative than they were in the 
model using fixed effects. They also noted that by differencing random border county pairs, 
rather than the border adjacent pairs, they produced results comparable to the original fixed 
effects rather than the adjacent border differencing. This would seem to be supportive, the paper 
points out, of utilizing the identification strategy of differencing cross border pairs of counties 
adjacent to one another. 
 The results of the cross border differencing analysis shows that there is no significant 
effect of the MME tax on manufacturing employment or wage levels. They go on to claim that if 
anything, there may actually be a positive correlation between the two, suggesting that a higher 
tax on machinery and equipment does not in fact cause businesses to cut jobs, but rather perhaps 
substitute away from the capital expenditures of this equipment and towards labor. 
Thompson & Rohlin (2012) 
Thompson & Rohlin explored a similar scenario, this paper focusing more on sales tax in 
general and its effect on employment rather than the more specific MME tax of the Mikesell and 
Ross paper. In areas near the border, if there are discrepancies in the rates at which sales taxes 
are applied, it may be relatively easy for residents of one state to simply cross the border into the 
adjacent state in order to make purchases, thus recognizing a lesser sales tax to be paid. The 
purpose of Thompson and Rohlin’s paper is to examine these tax rate differences among states, 
specifically by examining border counties, and determine whether or not these policy differences 
lead to an effect on the level of employment of each state. 
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 Thompson and Rohlin uses Quarterly Workforce Indicator (QWI) data from the 
Longitudinal Employer-Household Dynamics program of the U.S. Census Bureau for every 
county throughout 47 states (excludes Massachusetts in addition to Alaska and Hawaii). These 
data range from 2004 to 2009. These data are said to be sufficiently reliable and accurate due to 
the fact that they come from Unemployment Insurance records rather than surveys. The study 
uses a difference in difference model to estimate the effects of the difference in sales tax policies 
on the difference in employment. They further extend the study to examine the differences in 
impact among different age, gender, and industrial groups. 
 By using a county fixed effect model, and employing cross-border differencing, they 
view groups of people within the same labor market who are influenced by the same economic 
factors, with the only difference being the arbitrary separation of the two states, and therefore 
different policies concerning sales tax. The paper utilizes quarterly data, stating that previous 
studies that had used annual data risk losing the timeliness of policy changes and could perhaps 
miss some of the results due to aggregation bias.  
 One of the main assumptions needed when choosing cross-border pairs to examine is that 
transportation costs are low. This means that people have the ability to easily travel back and 
forth from state to state in order to do their shopping, thus making the difference in policy 
between the two states a recognizable option for consumers to exploit. Thompson and Rohlin 
insert a variable accounting for a county’s distance from the border, electing to use binary 
variables to indicate whether a county falls under the categories of “border”, “border-interior”, or 
simply “interior”. If the concept introduced above concerning transportation costs holds true, 
then the differences in employment should be the heaviest in border counties, where people can 
more easily cross the border, and lesser in the interior counties. The paper also incorporates the 
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level of cross-border employment between the two counties, which is used as a further indicator 
of low transportation costs. For people who live in one state and commute to the adjacent for 
work, transportation costs would obviously be low, as they are already making the trip over, 
perhaps daily. Cross state counties with higher levels of cross state employment should therefore 
realize larger effects of cross state differences in sales tax. Each county is put into one of four 
groups, based on what percent of cross border employment it exhibits. 
 The panel fixed effect results showed a coefficient between the sales tax variable and an 
indicator for state border counties of -3.6. This implies that for all border counties, an increase in 
the sales tax of one percentage point leads to a 3.6 percent decrease in employment. While 
running the analysis under cross-border differenced panels, results show that for border counties, 
a one percentage point increase in the sales tax led to a 5.8 percent decrease in employment. 
Thompson and Rohlin also used this section to view the effects on different demographics and 
industries, finding that the greatest decrease in employment came to the retail industry, and the 
demographics associated with it, which should come as little surprise. 
 The results also showed that in areas with heavier amounts of cross-border employment, 
the effects of sales tax changes on employment was greater, supporting a claim originally made 
by the paper that transportation costs would factor in to peoples’ behavior significantly. This is 
further supported by the fact that the coefficients for “interior” and “border-interior” counties 
were less negative, again leading to the conclusion that transportation costs and accessibility 
each play a large role in determining the effect of sales tax policy changes on the level of 
employment within those areas. 
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Patrick (2014) 
Instead of focusing on the effects that taxes have on employment, Patrick focuses on how 
non-tax incentives for capital investment can create effects on employment, a topic which she 
claims is understudied in literature. One of the main ideas this paper is exploring is the concept 
that tax policy changes are not the only significant way to support local economic growth, and 
that non-tax incentives have great effects as well. Patrick uses a variation method on state and 
local non-tax incentives to examine their job creation ability. The paper attempts to determine 
whether or not providing a private enterprise with an increased level of public aid availability 
will generate employment increases and job creation. The data gathered are U.S. county level 
panel data spanning from 1970-2006, annually, to account for short term effects, and from 1972-
2002, every five years, to examine the more medium term and long term effects. These data are 
gathered from the Bureau of Economic Analysis and the U.S. Census Bureau for all 48 
contiguous U.S. states.  Patrick looks specifically, like the papers discussed previously, at U.S. 
counties sharing a state border. The reasoning behind this is familiar, as Patrick states that 
“restricting analysis to locations on either side of a policy border further removes local sources 
of level and heterogeneity”. She also utilizes a variable to account for unobservable county level 
fixed effects. By using a random trend model, she also allows the county level and trend 
unobservable effects to be correlated with those that are observable, thus mitigating 
heterogeneity. 
 Patrick creates an Incentive Environment Index (IEI) for every state for every year from 
1970-2000. The IEI was created by Patrick through author’s research, and is made up of 
characteristics for each state and time gathered from things such as state constitutional provisions 
pertaining to the ability of state and local governments to provide aid to public entities. It serves 
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as a scoring system for each state and year’s propensity to provide aid. The paper goes into depth 
discussing the mechanisms of the IEI in greater detail. 
 Patrick runs regression analysis for both first difference and random trend models, using 
both the annual panel data and again using the five year panel data, for both full analysis and 
border-specific analysis, producing coefficients for the effect of IEI on employment levels and 
the effects of IEI on employment growth rates. The results from running the first difference 
estimation of the IEI on employment growth rates show no statistically or economically 
significant results on growth levels in either the annual or five year data. When running the 
analysis for the border samples only, the results were similarly insignificant at the whole. The 
coefficient of the effect of the IEI on the employment level for the five year sample does end up 
being significant at the 5% level, but the coefficient is small in magnitude (-.028). The paper 
closes by raising the concern that due to the results presented, policy makers should perhaps call 
into question the effectiveness of incentive programs as they pertain to increasing employment 
levels or employment growth rates. 
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4.) Data & Empirical Models 
The data used in this paper come from several sources. The data examined are primarily 
quarterly county level data from 2003 to 2013. I focus on Kansas and its bordering states, 
Colorado, Missouri, Nebraska, and Oklahoma, and all of the counties individually within each of 
these states. All data are assigned to states and counties by their Federal Information Processing 
Standards (FIPS) codes, which are identifiers for state and counties created and used by the 
United States Federal Government. 
Quarterly Workforce Indicator data are drawn from the U.S. Census website, through the 
Longitudinal Employer-Household Dynamics Extraction Tool. This site provides quarterly data 
on county employment, earnings, payroll, and job change. The data pertain to all jobs covered 
under states’ unemployment insurance (UI) programs and are collected through states’ UI wage 
reporting systems. It is noteworthy here that QWI data do not include all self-employed 
individuals, as they are not always covered by Unemployment Insurance. Data are available from 
2003 Q1 to 2013 Q4 for most variables. I select variables pertaining to private sector 
employment. State corporate income tax rates, individual income tax rates, and sales tax rates are 
all acquired from the Tax Foundation. The tax rates are reported as of the start of the calendar 
year. 
Income, per capita income, and population data are from the Bureau of Economic 
Analysis, regional data department. All three of these variables are available for all states and 
counties, but are only available yearly rather than quarterly. To remedy this issue, I use linear 
interpolation populate the quarterly data. I compute per capita income by dividing annual income 
by population. After generating annual per capita income, I then linearly interpolated to fill the 
quarterly data. Note that per capita income – even though it is reported in each quarter – is a 
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measurement of annual per capita income within the county, shown as gradually increasing 
throughout the four quarters of a year. Data for income (and per capita income) are available 
only from 2003 Q4 to 2012 Q4. Population data are available from 2003 Q4 to 2013 Q4. I 
control for population in my regression models, which are run on data through 2013 quarter 4. I 
use the income data only in descriptive analysis. It is noteworthy here that in order to experience 
the lower tax rates offered by Kansas, a small business owner from another state would have to 
both relocate their business and their place of residence to Kansas, as states have a reciprocity 
agreement in place. 
I used two samples of data to examine how the impacts Kansas private sector 
employment. I use a full sample of data spanning ten years that includes all counties in Kansas 
and its four neighboring states from 2003 Q4 to 2013 Q4. I also examine a second sample of 
border county pairs, in which I match each Kansas border county with the corresponding 
adjacent county from the neighboring state. I describe this matching process below. For the full 
sample, I begin with the following simple econometric model: 
(1) empijt = β0 + β1KS2013jt + β2Popijt + ϕi + λt + εijt, 
where empijt is private sector employment, measured in number of jobs, in county i and state j at 
time t, KS2013jt represents a dummy variable that is equal to 1 when state j equals Kansas and 
year equals 2013, 0 otherwise. Pop denotes population. ϕi is a county fixed effect to control for 
factors that are unique to a county, but do not change over time. The county fixed effect controls 
for unobserved heterogeneity at the county and state level that is not time varying. λt is a quarter-
year fixed effect to control for quarter and year effects that may impact county employment 
levels for all states. For example, in a national recession, private sector employment tends to 
decrease across all states, whereas in an expansion, employment tends to increase across all 
22 
 
states. εit is the error term. Note that the total private sector employment measure includes 
employment of both incorporated and unincorporated businesses. The policy change provides a 
tax break only to unincorporated businesses. This model is useful for isolating the change in 
employment stemming from the tax policy change that affects the counties in Kansas in 2013, 
and KS2013jt measures the impact of the policy change on private sector employment levels, 
relative to the counties in its neighboring states. It is a difference in difference estimator. If β1 is 
statistically significant and positive, then we infer that the policy change is associated with an 
increase in the private sector employment levels in Kansas. 
 I run an expanded econometric model to control for the other time varying factors that 
may affect employer location and expansion decisions: the state’s top corporate income marginal 
tax rate, top individual income marginal tax rate, and the sales tax rate: 
 (2) empijt = β0 + β1KS2013jt + β2Popijt +  β3Corpjt + β4MTRjt + β5Salesjt + ϕi + λt + εijt 
where Corpjt is the top corporate income marginal tax rate in state j at time t, MTRjt is the top 
individual income marginal tax rate in state j at time t, and Salesjt is the sales tax rate in state j at 
time t. Changes in each of these tax rates may also have an effect on employment. I would expect 
each of the coefficients of the tax rates to be negative, as a higher tax rate tends to be a 
disincentive for workers and employers. Here it is important to note that since variables are 
included for corporate income, individual income, and sales tax rates, KS2013jt  now only 
captures the effect of the tax base change of the Kansas policy change (since the tax rate changes 
are now accounted for elsewhere in this model). 
 For the Kansas border county sample, I used a differencing model in order to capture the 
changes observed in a Kansas county compared directly with its adjacent county match. This 
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approach has been used to control for a heterogeneous response bias (Mikesell & Ross, 2014) 
that can arise because of political economy considerations. An employer would be willing to pay 
as much as the net present value of its expected tax break to secure a tax decrease. This cannot be 
observed, so it is captured in the error term. In the full sample, the control group is all counties in 
other states. In the border differencing sample, though, the county specific control group is the 
adjacent county. As in Mikesell and Ross, the identification strategy of using cross-state border 
county pairs differences out the potential bias as long as the cross-border match is a useful 
counterfactual. The presence of agglomeration economies suggests a cross border match is an 
appropriate control group, and Mikesell and Ross provide evidence of this. Letting empijt 
represent Kansas county employment and empkmt represent the neighboring states matching 
county employment, 
 (3a) empijt = β0 + β1KS2013jt + β2Popijt + ϕi + λt + εijt 
 (3b) empkmt = γ0 + γ2Popkmt + ϕk+ λt + εkmt, 
where i represents the Kansas county, j represents the state of Kansas. k represents the matching 
county in the neighboring state m. KS2013jt equals 1 when the state is Kansas and year is 2013, 0 
otherwise. This is similar to how the variable was used in equations (1) and (2), but KS2013 
appears only in equation (3a), the Kansas equation, and not in equation (3b), which pertains to 
the cross border match. Thus equation (3a) is the treatment group and equation (3b) is the control 
group. By subtracting (3b) from (3a), we get: 
 (4) Δemppt = (β0 – γ0) + β1KS2013jt + (β2 – γ2)Poppt + (ϕi – ϕk) + εpt 
In this model we use p to identify each unique difference of cross state adjacent county pairs. 
Note that the quarter-year time fixed effect λt has dropped out. This model should give us insight 
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into how a Kansas county’s private sector employment numbers change with compared solely to 
its most closely geographically associated cross state county. As in model (1), a positive and 
significant β1 would indicate that Kansas counties on average experience an increase in 
employment post policy, relative to neighboring states, controlling for population and 
unobserved heterogeneity. I then use the expanded model: 
(5) Δemppt = Π0 + β1KS2013jt + Π1ΔPoppt + Π2 ΔCorppt + Π3 ΔMTRpt + Π4 ΔSalespt + εpt 
where ΔCorppt, ΔMTRpt, and ΔSalespt are the respective tax rates in the Kansas counties minus 
the tax rates in their matching counties. Π denotes the difference in parameters across the border 
pair. For example, Π0 = (β0 – γ0). Note, in equation (5), I expect (ϕi – ϕk) to be zero or very near 
zero, as it representative of the common unobserved heterogeneity experienced by counties that 
are located adjacent to each other. In this expanded model, as in equation (2), the KS2013jt 
variable now captures only the non-tax rate changes of the policy change. Equations (4) and (5) 
are additionally analyzed using Kansas City Metro county data only, as this is by far the most 
heavily populated region among the Kansas border. 
I run each equation will as a linear model, a log-linear model, and a per capita model. The 
variable representing the control for population is dropped in the per capita models. When 
selecting border county pairs, all Kansas counties were assigned exactly one adjacent county. As 
shown in Figures (3) and (4), the counties don’t always have a unique match, so in some 
instances, multiple Kansas counties will be matched to the same neighboring cross border 
county. I chose the match based first off of geographical standards, i.e. the approximate percent 
of the border shared. However in some cases, namely the Kansas City area, it was necessary to 
use population as a tiebreaker when geographic borders were approximately equal. 
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5.) Empirical Results 
 Table 2 displays the tax structures of each of the five states between 2004 and 2013. 
When tax structure changes occurred in each of these states is essential to modelling the policy 
changes’ effect on employment. Table 3 provides summary statistics for each state in 2013. Note 
that the business climate index variable is the rating given to each state in the 2015 publication of 
the Tax Foundation’s “2015 State Business Tax Climate Index”. These summary statistics are all 
presented as county-quarter averages. Table 4 provides summary statistics for all counties of the 
five states from 2004-2013. Table 5 shows the difference in variables from 2012 to 2013 (the 
years before and after Kansas’ policy change) for each state. Figure (1) displays the trend of 
population in each state from 2004-2013. The trend of real per capita income for each of the five 
states is shown in Figure (2). Note that the dotted vertical line is inserted to indicate the 
beginning of a recession. Note that results may have downward bias due to the QWI data not 
encapsulating all self-employed individuals, as some individuals may respond to the policy 
change by leaving their jobs from UI qualifying employers and begin self-employed work. 
Equation (1) models the impact of the 2013 tax policy change in Kansas on the level of 
private sector unemployment. This model controls for population differences and unobserved 
heterogeneity using a county fixed effect and quarter-year fixed effect. The results from this 
model give insight into how Kansas’ 2013 private employment levels (post tax change) compare 
to what we would expect them to be had there not been the change, relative to employment levels 
in the counties of Colorado, Missouri, Nebraska, and Oklahoma. 
 I first estimate equation (1) using quarterly data from 2004 to 2013. The results from the 
base models are mixed and are reported in columns (1), (3), and (5) of Table 6. Using 
employment level as the dependent variable, I find no statistical significance at the 10% level for 
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the coefficient of the policy change variable.4 Similarly, the model for the log of employment is 
not affected by the policy change, once population is controlled for. In the per capita base model 
for employment, however, a statistically significant coefficient exists, suggesting that per capita 
employment in Kansas has risen by 0.00489. The coefficient estimate implies that the policy 
change increases employment in Kansas counties on average by 4.9 jobs per 1000 people. 
Running these same models for a robustness check by using data from only 2010-2013 (in order 
to remove data from within the U.S. recession) returned statistically insignificant results, as 
shown columns (1), (3), and (5) of Table 7. 
 Equation (2) adds in variables for the three types of tax rates that may also affect 
employment outcomes: top corporate income marginal tax rate, top individual income marginal 
tax rate, and the sales tax rate. The results for 2004-2013 are presented in columns (2), (4), and 
(6) of Table 6, and the variables have statistical significance. The employment level model 
shows in column (2) that the tax base change portion of the policy has led to approximately 946 
fewer jobs on average in Kansas counties in 2013 compared to counties of the neighboring states. 
The log-linear and per capita models display similar results, showing average decreases of 6.7% 
in county employment, and 0.011464 in per capita county employment, respectively, both also 
significant at 1%. Across models, corporate income, individual income, and sales tax rates are 
negatively correlated with employment. We can see that in each model, the magnitude of the 
corporate income tax rate coefficient is larger than that of the individual income tax rate, 
suggesting that a 1 percentage point corporate income tax rate change has a larger impact on 
employment. Kansas Governor Sam Brownback has stated publicly that “…if you want to 
                                                          
4 The “raw” effect, controlling for only KS2013 and the fixed effects, in the employment level model is statistically 
significant at 10% with a coefficient of -316, and the log model is not significant. 
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expand your economy, you’ve got to get small business growing” (Lowry, 2014), yet the data 
suggest lowering corporate tax rates may have a larger effect on employment growth. 
Running the model for years 2010-2013 also shows negative correlations for each 
variable, but the corporate tax rates were omitted for collinearity reasons (corporate income tax 
rates had almost no change during this time period and so are collinear with fixed effects). 
Impacts of the tax base change variable showed no statistical significance in the employment 
level model, but had a quite large -17.27% effect on employment in the log-linear model, and -
0.025 on per capita employment at a significance level of 5%. The per capita model coefficient 
suggests that jobs have decreased at a rate of 24.6 jobs per 1,000 people post tax base change. 
While almost all of the full sample analysis returned variable coefficients suggesting 
negative relationships between employment and the tax policy change, the border differencing 
models gave mixed results. When running equation (4), I regressed the 2013 policy change 
against the difference in employment between a given Kansas county and its cross border 
matching county, with results displayed in Table 8a. When doing this for the 2004-2013 sample, 
in Table 8a, columns (1), (3), and (5), the base models, controlling for only KS2013 and 
population, indicate that the tax change policy had a more positive effect on employment. For 
example, in the employment level model, column (1), the policy variable assumes a coefficient 
of 685.97, interpreted to mean that Kansas border counties had on average a difference of almost 
686 more jobs than their cross state border matched counties, controlling for population. The 
policy change variable also has a positive impact on the per capita employment difference, 
0.0048497. These models were then run again for the 2010-2013 border county sample, but 
returned no significant results, displayed in Table 9, columns (1), (3), and (5). 
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In the full models controlling for tax structure, as shown in columns (2), (4), and (6) of 
Table 8a, the results indicate a statistically significant negative correlation between the tax base 
change and employment levels in Kansas relative to its neighbors. Across models, the policy 
change variable returned values of -1002.821 on the employment variable, -9.9% in the log-
linear model, and -0.012 in per capita employment. When running those same models for 2010-
2014, the results for employment level and per capita employment were again insignificant, as 
depicted in columns (2) and (6) of Table 9. Column (4), displaying the log-linear model, was -
12.9%. Table 8b returned similar, yet largely insignificant results. 
It is noteworthy that, where results show significance, there seems to be a pattern of 
negative correlation between the tax base change in Kansas 2013 and employment. This is 
counter-intuitive, as the exemptions were enacted with job creation in mind, so it would be 
expected that even in the new policy’s first year, we would start to see some influx of small 
business jobs into Kansas’ economy. It is possible that small business jobs, which is what the tax 
cuts are targeted at, have in fact been increasing, but others such as perhaps corporate jobs have 
decreased at a faster rate. It is also possible that, since self-employed individuals are not included 
in the data, some workers could be leaving their employee jobs in order to become self-
employed, and would therefore appear in our results as negative employment. However, since 
self-start-up projects tend to decrease in areas with lower individual income tax rates, it is 
unlikely that this would cause a negative bias in our results (Cullen & Gordon, 2007). 
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6.) Conclusion 
 In this paper I analyze the effects of the changes to the 2013 Kansas state income tax 
laws on employment. I used a county and quarter-year fixed effects model to view overall 
employment changes, logarithmic employment changes, and per capita employment changes in 
Kansas counties compared to counties in its four neighboring states: Colorado, Missouri, 
Nebraska, and Oklahoma. I ran data from 2004-2013 and reran the models using 2010-2014 data 
to check for more recent effects. In the full models controlling for tax structure, results indicate a 
negative correlation between the Kansas tax policy change and private. Using border matched 
differencing models examining the same effects, pairing each Kansas county with its adjacent 
county from a neighboring state, I found negative effects similar in magnitude. 
 It is noteworthy that the individual income tax rate independent from the tax cut had a 
significant negative relationship with employment levels. These results suggest that Kansas 
could be experiencing an increase in employment due to the income tax rate cuts, but perhaps a 
decrease in employment due to the tax base change. Since 2013 is only the first year of the tax 
change, and since it along with the pass-through exemption amounts will be phasing in over the 
next 5 years, it would be important to monitor employment effects over the next decade, and see 
if those effects start to take place. It would also be necessary to closely monitor the employment 
changes near the Kansas City area between Kansas and Missouri. This is by far the most 
populated area of any Kansas border, and once more data become available it would be helpful 
to see how unincorporated businesses and their owners make choices with regard to the border 
and relocation. 
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TABLES 
 
Table 1. Kansas Top Individual Income Marginal Tax Rates: 2012-2018 
Year Minimum Tax Rate Maximum Tax Rate 
2012 3.50% 6.45% 
2013 3.00% 4.90% 
2014 2.70% 4.80% 
2015 2.70% 4.60% 
2016 2.40% 4.60% 
2017 2.30% 4.60% 
2018 2.30% 3.90% 
Source: KLRD (2013). 
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Table 2. Recent History of Tax Rates: Kansas and Neighboring States 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Tax Foundation (2013). 
State Sales Tax Rate (%) 
Year CO KS MO NE OK 
2003 2.90 4.90 4.23 5.00 4.50 
2004 2.90 5.30 4.23 5.50 4.50 
2005 2.90 5.30 4.23 5.50 4.50 
2006 2.90 5.30 4.23 5.50 4.50 
2007 2.90 5.30 4.23 5.50 4.50 
2008 2.90 5.30 4.23 5.50 4.50 
2009 2.90 5.30 4.23 5.50 4.50 
2010 2.90 5.30 4.23 5.50 4.50 
2011 2.90 6.30 4.23 5.50 4.50 
2012 2.90 6.30 4.23 5.50 4.50 
2013 2.90 6.30 4.23 5.50 4.50 
State Top Corporate Income Marginal Tax Rate (%) 
Year CO KS MO NE OK 
2003 4.63 7.35 6.25 7.81 6.00 
2004 4.63 7.35 6.25 7.81 6.00 
2005 4.63 7.35 6.25 7.81 6.00 
2006 4.63 7.35 6.25 7.81 6.00 
2007 4.63 7.35 6.25 7.81 6.00 
2008 4.63 7.35 6.25 7.81 6.00 
2009 4.63 7.05 6.25 7.81 6.00 
2010 4.63 7.05 6.25 7.81 6.00 
2011 4.63 7.00 6.25 7.81 6.00 
2012 4.63 7.00 6.25 7.81 6.00 
2013 4.63 7.00 6.25 7.81 6.00 
State Top Individual Income Marginal Tax Rate (%) 
Year CO KS MO NE OK 
2003 4.63 6.45 6.00 6.68 6.65 
2004 4.63 6.45 6.00 6.84 7.00 
2005 4.63 6.45 6.00 6.84 6.65 
2006 4.63 6.45 6.00 6.84 6.65 
2007 4.63 6.45 6.00 6.84 6.25 
2008 4.63 6.45 6.00 6.84 5.65 
2009 4.63 6.45 6.00 6.84 5.50 
2010 4.63 6.45 6.00 6.84 5.50 
2011 4.63 6.45 6.00 6.84 5.50 
2012 4.63 6.45 6.00 6.84 5.25 
2013 4.63 4.90 6.00 6.84 5.25 
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Table 3. County Characteristics by State: 2013 
Variable CO KS MO NE OK 
Private Emp. 30342.58 10383.41 19094.02 8312.4 15973.74 
Population 81844.88 27532.74 52485.67 20039.19 49833.28 
Private Earnings 
($1000s) 
2902.5 2746.17 2421.07 2532.09 2905.9 
Corp MTR 0.0463 0.07 0.0625 0.0781 0.06 
Ind MTR 0.0463 0.049 0.06 0.0684 0.0525 
Sales Tax Rate 0.029 0.063 0.04225 0.055 0.045 
Climate Index 5.21 5.21 5.48 4.85 4.85 
State Min Wage 7.78 7.25 7.35 7.25 7.25 
Notes: County-quarter averages are reported.  
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Table 4a – Summary Statistics for Full Sample: County Averages, All States 2004-2013. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Data Sources: Census Bureau, QWI, BEA, Tax Foundation. MTR indicates top marginal tax rate. There 
are 18,160 county-quarter observations. All dollar amounts adjusted to 2013 dollars using urban CPI. 
Table 4b – Summary Statistics for Border Sample: County Averages, All States 2004-2013. 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Private Empl. 12676.09 46631.43 95 327391 
Population 32775.09 94836.52 1210 679996 
Priv. Earnings (in 
$1000s) 
2397.18 553.51 1302 5694 
Corp MTR 0.068 0.009 0.0463 0.0781 
Ind. MTR 0.062 0.007 0.0463 0.07 
Sales Tax Rate 0.051 0.009 0.029 0.063 
State Min Wage 5.87 1.92 2.87 7.91 
 
Data Sources: Census Bureau, QWI, BEA, Tax Foundation. MTR indicates top marginal tax rate. There 
are 3,240 county-quarter observations. All dollar amounts adjusted to 2013 dollars using urban CPI. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Private Empl. 
15589.68 51371.92 10 577428 
Population 
42057.10 105579.80 428 1010712 
Priv Earnings (in 
$1000s) 
2554.40 593.69 690.64 12256.19 
Corp MTR 
0.0652 0.0101 0.0463 0.0781 
Ind. MTR 
0.0603 0.0074 0.0463 0.0700 
Sales Tax Rate 
0.0466 0.0094 0.0290 0.0630 
State Min Wage  
6.4504 1.5109 2.8673 7.9051 
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Table 5. Changes in County Characteristics by State: 2012 to 2013 
Variable CO KS MO NE OK 
Private Emp. 919.62 191.4 296.57 151.97 233.76 
Population 1262.26 76.69 192.9 139.69 464.26 
Private Earnings 
($1000s) 
19.955 18.95 -2.362 63.85 -34.624 
Corp MTR 0 0 0 0 0 
Ind MTR 0 -0.0155 0 0 0 
Sales Tax Rate 0 0 0 0 0 
State Min Wage 0.03 -0.11 -0.01 -0.11 -0.11 
Notes: Change in a variable is computed at the county level as the 4th quarter change (2013:Q4 – 
2012:Q4) and averaged over counties. All dollar amounts are adjusted to 2013 dollars using urban CPI.  
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Table 6. Effect of Tax Policy Change on Private Sector Employment: Full Sample 2004-2013 
 
  Full Sample 
     2004 to 2013  
  Employment Level Log of Employment Per Capita Employment 
        
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
KS 2013  -165.65 -946.02*** -0.0014 -0.067*** 0.00489* -0.0115*** 
  (148.88) (300.55) (0.011) (0.02) (0.0027) (0.0039) 
Corp   -1617.77**  -.08255**  -.03526*** 
   (778.9563)  (.0346)  (0.00886) 
MTR   -452.80***  -.0432***  -0.008044*** 
   (146.4978)  (.0126)  (0.002326) 
Sales   -229.89**  -.0141*  -0.002620 
   (101.72)  (0.0074)  (0.00177) 
Population 0.1106*** 0.111*** 0.00101*** 0.0011***   
  (0.0320) (0.032) (0.00037) (0.00037)   
Constant  10368.*** 24833*** 7.91*** 8.785*** 0.2399*** 0.5333*** 
  (1311.24) (5953.35) (0.014) (0.2644) (0.0013) (0.066) 
County FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Quarter-Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
=========================================================================== 
 Notes: Sample size is 18,160 county-quarter observations. ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1. For 
the log-linear models, population was replaced with population in thousands. Cluster-robust 
standard errors in parentheses (cluster county). Models include county and quarter-year fixed 
effects. Corp, MTR, and Sales tax rates are multiplied by 100 (displayed is the coefficient 
estimate corresponding to 1 percentage point increase in the tax rate). 
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Table 7. Effect of Tax Policy Change on Private Sector Employment: Full Sample 2010-2013 
  Full Sample 
     2010 to 2013  
  Employment Level Log of Employment Per Capita Employment 
        
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
KS 2013  -22.184 -267.40 -0.0053 -0.1727*** 0.00045 -0.0246** 
  (72.83) (579.52) (0.0072) (0.059) (0.0016) (0.0123) 
Corp        
        
MTR   -165.1237  -0.1124***  -0.0167** 
   (383.8551)  (0.3806)  (0.008) 
Sales   -14.1195  -0.00843  -0.00054 
   (69.62)  (0.00621)  (0.0015) 
Population 0.6877*** 0.6876*** 0.00106*** 0.000989**   
  (0.0501) (0.0501) (0.0004) (0.000415)   
Constant  -14558.6*** -13499*** 7.897*** 8.613*** 0.2327*** 0.33512*** 
  (2164.87) (3485.73) (0.0157) (0.229) (0.0009) (0.048) 
County FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Quarter-Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
=========================================================================== 
Notes: Sample size is 7,264 county-quarter observations. ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1. For the 
log-linear models, population is replaced with population in thousands. Corporate tax rate is 
omitted as it did not change significantly over this time period. Cluster-robust standard errors in 
parentheses (cluster county). Models include county and quarter-year fixed effects. Corp, MTR, 
and Sales tax rates are multiplied by 100 (displayed is the coefficient estimate corresponding to 1 
percentage point increase in the tax rate). 
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Table 8a. Effect of Tax Policy Change on Private Employment: Border Sample 2004-2013 
  Border County Sample 
     2004 to 2013  
  Employment Level Log of Employment Per Capita Employment 
        
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
KS 2013  685.97*** -1002.8*** 0.00172 -0.0992*** 0.00485** -0.012*** 
  (202.7843) (373.12) (0.0109) (0.0205) (0.00231) (0.0043) 
ΔCorp   -2752.3***  -0.076***  -0.0157*** 
   (491.12)  (0.0297)  (0.0058) 
ΔMTR   -601.97***  -0.0708***  -0.0094*** 
   (192.97)  (0.0107)  (0.0022) 
ΔSales   416.93**  -0.01107  0.0017 
   (192.02)  (0.011)  (0.0023) 
ΔPopulation 0.4136*** 0.4119*** 0.0045*** 0.00438***   
  (0.0129) (0.013) (0.001) (0.001)   
Constant  140.73 2354.79 -0.2342 -0.1253 0.0024 0.0188 
  (1402.8) (1565.12) (0.197) (0.2028) (0.0187) (0.0196) 
=========================================================================== 
Notes: Sample size is 1,600 county-quarter observations. ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1. For the 
log-linear models, population is replaced with population in thousands. Corp, MTR, and Sales 
tax rates are multiplied by 100 (displayed is the coefficient estimate corresponding to 1 
percentage point increase in the tax rate). 
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Table 8b. Effect of Tax Policy Change on Private Employment: KC MSA Sample 2004-2013 
  KC MSA Border County Sample 
     2004 to 2013  
  Employment Level Log of Employment Per Capita Employment 
        
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
KS 2013  3888.9** -2484.8 -0.0168 -0.008 0.0025 -0.0027 
  (1554.4) (2113.8) (0.014) (0.02) (0.003) (0.005) 
ΔCorp   -17637***  0.133***  .0128 
   (3612)  (0.036)  (.0089) 
ΔMTR   -697.95  -0.002  -0.001 
   (1446.4)  (0.014)  (0.0036) 
ΔSales   2048.3  0.0175  0.0079** 
   (1505.5)  (0.015)  (0.0037) 
ΔPopulation 0.408*** 0.377*** 0.0017*** 0.0019***   
  (44.37) (0.041) (0.0005) (0.0005)   
Constant  -1632.85 8495.7 -0.650** -0.776*** -0.0496 -0.071 
  (13872) (14555) (0.258) (0.262) (0.054) (0.055) 
=========================================================================== 
Notes: Sample size is 200 county-quarter observations. ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1. For the 
log-linear models, population is replaced with population in thousands. Corp, MTR, and Sales 
tax rates are multiplied by 100 (displayed is the coefficient estimate corresponding to 1 
percentage point increase in the tax rate). 
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Table 9. Effect of Tax Policy Change on Private Sector Employment: Border Sample 2010-2013 
  Border County Sample 
     2010 to 2013  
  Employment Level Log of Employment Per Capita Employment 
        
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
KS 2013  -15.65 855.14 0.0037 -0.129* 0.00234 -0.0213 
  (81.05) (839.83) (0.0067) (0.069) (0.0016) (0.017) 
ΔCorp   -231.139  -0.062  0.01 
   (1327.54)  (0.184)  (0.019) 
ΔMTR   614.11  -0.0905**  -0.016 
   (552.38)  (0.046)  (0.011) 
ΔSales   139.18  -0.012  0.0016 
   (11115.22)  (0.0118)  (0.002) 
ΔPopulation 0.4712*** 0.4731*** 0.00343* 0.0033*   
  (0.0147) (0.015) (0.0018) (0.0018)   
Constant  2288.7 1894.5 -0.263 -0.1472 0.00495 0.0054 
  (1423.7) (1764.5) (0.204) (0.25) (0.019) (0.0231) 
=========================================================================== 
Notes: Sample size is 640 county-quarter observations. ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1. For the 
log-linear models, population is replaced with population in thousands. Corp, MTR, and Sales 
tax rates are multiplied by 100 (displayed is the coefficient estimate corresponding to 1 
percentage point increase in the tax rate). 
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FIGURES 
Figure 1. Population Trends by State 
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Figure 2. Growth in Real per Capita Income by State
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Figure 3. Map of Counties 
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Figure 4. Example of County Pairs 
 
Source: Mikesell and Ross (2014). 
